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NATURE OF CASE 
No. 17070 
This is an action by plaintiffs to recover damages 
for personal injury sustained to the plaintiff, Donald H. 
Meyers and for loss of services and other expenses incurred 
by the corporate plaintiff, Engineering Enterprises, Inc. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff brought this action against the defen-
dants, Interwest Corporation, a Utah corporation; Skychoppers 
of Utah, a Utah corporation; and Skychoppers of Colorado, a 
Colorado corporation. Defendants Interwest Corporation and 
Skychoppers of Utah have filed Answers to plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
The third defendant, Skychoppers of Colorado, was 
served with a Summons on August 8, 1978 and no Answer or 
Default Certificate has ever been filed. Defendant Sky-
choppers of Colorado's Motion to Quash Service was filed on 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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August 7, 1980, more than 20 months after the original ser-
vice. Subsequent to defendant's Motion to Quash Service, 
the plaintiffs also moved the court for an Order to Amend 
the process contested by the defendant. After hearing, in 
which the Motions were argued, the court denied defendant's 
Motion to Quash and granted the plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
the service. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Skychoppers of Colorado's Interlocutory 
Appeal seeks a reversal of the trial court's Order granting 
plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and denying defendant's Motion 
to Quash the process served upon it. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs' Complaint states a cause of action 
against defendants for injuries sustained by the plaintiff 
Meyers and damages sustained by the defendant Engineering 
Enterprises, Inc. which arose out of a helicopter accident 
that occurred in the State of Colorado on August 8, 1974. 
Several negotiations were undertaken between the parties and 
Complaints were finally filed on August 7, 1978. Defendant 
Skychoppers of Colorado was served in the State of Colorado 
on August 15, 1978. Nearly 20 months later, on August 7, 
1980, Skychoppers of Colorado appeared specially and filed a 
Motion to Quash the process served upon it. Subsequent to 
the filing of defendant's Motion, plaintiffs filed their own 
- 2 -
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Motion to Amend process pursuant to Rule 4(h) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The hearing on said Motion was 
held before the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County,'the Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding. 
The court entered its Order, on April 14, 1980, 
denying defendant Skychoppers of Colorado's Motion to Quash 
and granting plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Summons to show 
30 days rather than 20 days as the time for answering. 
From said Order defendant Skychoppers of Colorado petitioned 
for interlocutory appeal which was granted by this court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: RULE 4(h) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
MAKES AMENDMENTS TO PROCESS OR PROOF OF SERVICE 
A DISCRETIONARY MATTER. 
The trial court's decision to permit the amendment 
of the Summons in this case was made pursuant to Rule 4(h) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which specifies as 
follows: 
At any time in its discretion and upon such 
terms as it deems just, the court may allow 
any process or proof of service thereof to 
be amended . . . 
Rule 4(h) places within the discretion of the 
court the determination of whether justice will be served 
by allowing the amendment. The intent of Rule 4(h) was 
discussed in the case of Ballard v. Buist, 8 Ut.2d 308, 333 
P.2d 1071 (1959). The Ballard appeal was brought when the 
- 3 -
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defendant's Motion to Quash service of Summons and to dis-
miss the Complaint was granted by the District Court. In 
that case the action was commenced by a minor prior to the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem 
then moved to amend the Summonses and Complaint to show the 
prosecution of the claim by the guardian. This court held 
that the District Court erred in quashing service on the 
grounds that the minor could not initiate the action and 
thus the District Court never obtained jurisdiction. The 
court reasoned that the technical error was a mere irregu-
larity which could be cured by amendment, though the act of 
service, as characterized by defendant in this case, "was a 
completed act." Specifically, the court stated: 
Although the court obtained jurisdiction when 
the Summonses were properly served, such Sum-
monses were subject to a Motion to Quash be-
cause of the provisions of Rule 17(b) ••• 
. . . However, the fact that a minor must 
appear by a guardian ad litem in a pending 
suit does not mean that process issued in 
initiating a suit by a minor makes such pro-
cess void. It is a mere irregularity which 
can be cured by the appointment of a guardian 
ad litem and ba amendment. 333 P.2d at 1073. 
(Emphasis adde .) 
Speaking concerning the court's discretion to 
allow amendments pursuant to Rule 4(h), the court further 
stated: 
. . . The facts in the instant matter clearly 
require the allowance of the requested amend-
ment so that the matter may be heard upon the 
merits. The amendments could prejudice none 
- 4 -
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of the parties, and could only tend to serve 
justice. To disallow the amendment was an 
abuse of discretion. It has always been the 
rule in this state to be liberal in the 
allowance of amendment to the end there can 
be a complete adjudication of the controversy 
upon the merits and so that justice may be 
served. 333 P.2d at 1074. 
It is clear from the above-referred to case that 
this court takes the position that mere mistakes in the pro· 
cess do not make the process void but merely voidable and 
the subject of amendment to cure the defect. 
The question of discretion exercised by a court of 
law has been addressed by this court and other courts on 
several occasions and it is undisputed in this jurisdiction 
that where a court is granted discretionary authority to 
perform a proposed action, that the reviewing court must 
allow considerable latitude in which the court below may 
exercise that judgment. Further, it is undisputed law in 
this jurisdiction that when a court has ruled on a discre-
tionary matter that it shall not be reversed unless its 
actions are clearly found to be arbitrary. See Carmen v. 
Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (1976); Airkem International, Inc. v. 
Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Ut. 1973). 
Many jurisdictions have made an attempt to define 
an appropriate test to determine when a court has abused its 
discretion. The majority of the cases have concluded that 
the appropriate test of abuse of discretion is whether the 
trial court exceeded bounds of reason and the judicial 
- 5 -
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action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable. Marriage of 
Connolly, 591 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1979); Trompeter v. Trompeter, 
545 P.2d 297 (Kan. 1976). Other courts have attempted to 
refine the test further by indicating that judicial discre-
tion is abused only when there is a finding that no reason-
able man could take the same view adopted by the court below. 
Essentially these courts have held that if reasonable men 
could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the 
court below, then it could not be said that the court has 
abused its discretion. State v. Wilkins, 556 P.2d 424 (Kan. 
1976); Vickers v. Kansas City, 531 P.2d 113 (Kan. 1975); 
Spingola v. Spingola, 580 P.2d 958 (N.M. 1978). 
Based upon the facts of this case, it would be 
impossible to conclude that the trial court exceeded the 
bounds of reason, considering all circumstances and facts 
before it. The fact that the Summons was served upon the 
defendant Skychoppers on August 8, 1978 and no Answer or 
Default Certificate was filed prior to defendant's Motion to 
Quash brought on April 7, 1980, some 20 months thereafter, 
is evidence that the action taken by the court below has 
produced the only equitable and just result available. The 
appellant's Motion could have been granted but was not 
after full consideration by the trial court. Accordingly, 
the trial court's decision should not be disturbed. 
POINT II.: ilHEN THE RETURll DAY OF PROCESS IS MISTAKENLY 
OR PEFECTIVELY STATF.D, IT DOES NOT RENDER THE 
PROCESS VOID BUT MERELY IRREGULAR AND MAY BE 
AMENDED. 
- f, -
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The holding of this court in the Ballard case is 
also clearly applicable to the instant matter by analogy. 
Though Ballard, supra, concerned the defect in naming the 
proper plaintiff, the reasoning of the court's holding is 
clearly applicable in circumstances where the return day is 
erroneously or mistakenly stated. Again quoting from 
Ballard: 
The SumCTonses served upon respondents fully 
informed them as to who the real party in 
interest is, the nature of the action, the 
name of the court in which they were to ap-
pear and the time within which to do so. 
No disadvantage accrued to them from the 
fact that the Summonses were brought in the 
minor appellant's name . 333 P.2d at 
1073. 
In the case before the court, the defect, which 
was cured by amendment, was a misstatement as to the time 
allowed for answering. All of the other elements espoused 
by the court in Ballard were present, i.e., the real parties 
in interest were named, the nature of the action was given, 
and the name of the court in which the parties were to re-
spond was clearly stated. 
A notable authority has commented in respect to 
this type of defect as follows: 
No general rule can be laid down as to the 
effects of defects or informalities, with 
regards to the appearance or return day, in 
a Summons or a Notice of Commencement of an 
action in a court of record, because some 
defects are held to render a Summons abso-
lutely void and to invalidate all subsequent 
proceedings in the action, while other de-
fects are held to be simply irregular and 
- 7 -
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subject to amendment, and because the same 
defect is held in some jurisdictions to be 
fatal and others curable. It may be said, 
however that in the ma"orit of cases con-
siderin the act that the return da o 
process e ective y stated, 
the rule seems to be that it does not ren-
der the process void, but only voidable. 
It seems generally agreed that a Summons 
which is returnable in fewer than the number 
of days provided by statute will be quashed 
on Motion, although in many cases the courts 
have held that a Summons returnable in less 
than the required time is merely irregular 
and may be amended or considered sufficient. 
62 Am.Jur.2d Process §14 at 796-797. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The following authorities additionally support the 
proposition that the defect, though subject to a Motion to 
Quash, does not render the process void nor deprives the 
court of jurisdiction. See Flannery v. Kusha, 173 N.W. 652 
(1919); Richmond and D.R. Company v. Benson, 12 S.E. 357 
(Ga. 1890); Krueger v. Lynch, 48 N.W.2d 266 (1951); Lockway 
v. Modern Woodmen, 133 N.W. 398 (1911); T. A. Howard Lumber 
Company v. Hopson, 101 So. 363 (1924); Simmons v. Norfolk 
and B.S.B. Company, 18 S.E. 117 (1893); Barker Company v. 
Central West Investment Company, 105 N.W. 985 (1905); Gribbon 
v. Freel, 93 N.Y. 93 (1883); Spokane Merchants Associates v. 
Acord, 99 Wash. 674, 170 P. 329 (1918). 
In the case of Lockway v. Modern Woodmen, supra, 
the Minnesota Court answered the question here presented. 
In that case, the Summons required the defendant to answer 
within 20 days instead of 30. The statute that was 
- 8 -
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applicable indicated that a Summons requiring less than 30 
days for answering would not be valid or binding. Neverthe· 
less, it was held that the Summons was subject to amendment 
to conform to the statute and defendant's Motion to Quash 
was properly denied. 
The statute in which the appellant relies is 
§78-27-27, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), which 
specifically precludes the entry of a default judgment prior 
to the expiration of at least 30 days following service of 
process. Respondent has found no authority which would 
mandate a conclusion that the above-referred to statute acts 
to void service which mistakenly indicates that the served 
party only has 20 days to respond. As is stated in a prior 
section, §78-27-22, Utah Code Annotated (1953): 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maxi-
mum protection to the citizens of this 
state, should be applied so as to assert 
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to 
the fullest expended extent propounded by 
due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The 
purpose of the jurisdictional provisions ~ 
that act dictate that the construction of 
the act should be made so that where at all 
possible, jurisdiction of the court can ex-
tend as it ~ertains to non-residents named 
as parties in actions instituted in the 
State of Utah. (Emphasis added.) 
This is an unusual and important case; unusual 
because it does not involve the standard situation where the 
defendant has failed to file his Answer and a Default Judg-
ment is obtained against him. It does not involve a 
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situation where the defendant was served with the improper 
wording in the Summons and promptly moves to have the ser-
vice quashed or, if a judgment has been taken, to have that 
judgment set aside. It does not involve the situation where 
a defendant through inadvertence or mistake neglected to 
answer the Complaint served and a default judgment was taken. 
This case, however, is a case which involves a defendant who 
has participated in settlement negotiations for a period of 
time in excess of 20 months, and who never filed an Answer 
or moved to quash service of the Summons until after the 
time period had run for issuing a new Summons in this matter. 
This additionally involves a case in which the defendant has 
now chosen to appear only after 20 months to quash the ser-
vice originally considered by all parties to be valid. 
This case is important because it involves public 
policy arguments which if resolved in favor of the defendant 
Skychoppers of Colorado, would make a mockery of the judi-
cial process and it would allow defendants to take advantage 
or procedural difficulties while at the same time inducing 
an adverse party's inaction to their detriment. If plain-
tiffs had not been induced into inaction on the Complaint, 
the error or mistake would have been discovered and cor-
rected prior to the time that a new Summons could no longer 
be issued. 
- 10 -
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At first impression defendant's arguments have 
some appeal; however, upon introspection, that appeal is 
only cosmetic and only would represent a valid argument 
should the defect in the Summons be necessary to invalidate 
a Default Judgment against it. Defendant-appellant has 
analyzed its position not properly considering the realities 
of the situation. First the defendant-appellant has assumed 
that the irregularities of the process are jurisdictional 
and render the judgment void. The cases relied upon by the 
defendant-appellant on their face appear to support its 
proposition. However, a closer investigation indicates that 
the defendant's failure to make a timely Motion has caused 
the waiver of its rights to claim that the irregularities 
rendered the service of process void. None of the cases 
cited by the defendant-appellant is on all fours with this 
situation and can be distinguished either by the fact that 
the question presented to the courts does not include whe-
ther the defect constituted a void or voidable process and 
in addition, in almost every case, the question was pre-
sented under the circumstances where a Default Judgment was 
being contested. This case differs factually and equitably 
because no judgment or action was taken by plaintiff towards 
default and by the discretion of the court, process was 
amended. 
Defendant-appellant's authorities simply do not 
hold that the defects rendered the service of no effect but 
even if they did, the defendant has waived any objection it 
might have by failing to timely file a Motion to Quash. In 
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cases where defaults have been taken based upon a defective 
Summons, which cases are more extreme than the instant case, 
this court has held that a Motion must be timely raised or 
it will be waived'. Miller v. Ziegler, 3 Ut. 17, 5 P. 518 
(1881). The court in Miller justified its position by 
stating: 
Defendant should not be permitted to sit 
quietly by and seek judgment against him by 
default and then in the appellate court suc-
cessfully ask that judgment be reversed for 
the reasons that there was no service. 5 P. 
at 520. 
In that case, the court indicated that even where 
a judgment had been taken, if the Motion was not timely 
filed that the objection was waived. In this case, where 
the service did not result in a judgment, certainly the same 
position would be equally true. In all the cases cited by 
the defendant-appellant the defect was raised promptly and 
nowhere therein do any of the courts hold that the defect as 
claimed rendered the service or a judgment automatically 
void. On the contrary, a better reasoned approach is that 
such defect rendered the service and judgment voidable, un-
less amended, upon timely Motion. In the case of Thomas v. 
District Court of Third Judicial District in and for Salt 
Lake County, 171 P.2d 667 (1946), which case appears to be 
the principal case for this proposition in Utah, stresses 
this requireQent of timeliness in such situations by holding 
that the service should be quashed "when timely attacked by 
- 12 -
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Motion." This reflects the view quoted by the court in 
Thomas in the paragraph immediately preceding its holdings 
that defective service, such as in the instant case, is 
voidable and will' be avoided by a Motion to Quash if made by 
the defendant, but if not so avoided, a judgment rendered 
thereon by default need not be set aside when attacked for 
defects in the service. 171 P.2d at 677. 
Rule 4(h) would be meaningless, if as defendant-
appel lant contends, that such defects in the service made th; 
process automatically void. There would be no need for the 
discretionary grant to the court to allow amendment of such 
process. 
Defendant-appellant apparently relies heavily on 
the case of Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (1975), in which 
the court held service of process was defective because it 
required an Answer in 20 days instead of 30 days. Nowhere 
is it stated in that opinion or any other opinion found 
within the decisions of this court that such defect acts to 
void the process. It is admitted, by the amendment re-
quested, that the process was defective in that it stated 20 
days for answering instead of 30. The crucial question 
becomes whether the defect could be cured by amendment as 
is indicated in Rule 4(h). Plaintiff-respondent points to 
the arguments above and the case authorities cited for the 
proposition that process was cured by amendnent and that 
defendant-appellant's Motion to Quash was properly denied. 
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POINT III.: DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS NOT MISLED OR DIS-
ADVANTAGED BY THE MISTAKENLY STATED RETURN 
DAY AND THUS IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF 
SOUGHT. 
It is the general rule of law that the effect of 
misstating the return day depends to a considerable extent 
upon whether the defendant was misled to its disadvantage 
thereby. Flannery v. Kusha, supra; Spokane Merchant's 
Association v. Acord, supra; 62 Am.Jur.2d Process §15 at 
798. Defendant-appellants in their Brief and also in their 
Petition for Appeal have made no allegations that they were 
in any way misled to their disadvantage. In fact, they 
impliedly indicate that they were not aware of the defect 
until 20 months after the original service had been ef-
fected. All parties considered the process to be proper and 
sufficient and had through mutual agreeMent, contemplating 
settlement, not required the defendant Skychoppers of 
Colorado to answer or otherwise plead. The question left 
begging in these circumstances is just exactly how the 
defendan~ Skychoppers of Colorado was disadvantaged in these 
circumstances where no action toward default was ever taken. 
If anything, the plaintiffs-respondents would be the only 
parties who could complain of being misled to their dis-
advantage. If in fact the defendant Skychoppers of Colorado 
did know of the defect and induced the plaintiff to not 
require that an answer be filed and thus the defect be dis-
covered, then of course the defendant Skychoppers of Colorado 
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would be equitably estopped in raising the defense to the 
process at this point in time. If on the other hand, the 
defendant Skychoppers of Colorado did not know of the defect 
or was not aware of the defect at the time, but still in-
duced the plaintiffs into inaction, thus creatin8 a situa-
tion where the defect was not discovered until after the 
time in which new process could be issued, then only the 
plaintiffs-respondents have been misled to their disadvan-
tage and not the defendant in this matter. Accordingly, if 
there are any equities in this case at all, they lie in 
favor of the plaintiffs-respondents. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order entered by the court below is clearly 
supported by the case law and rules of procedure of this 
jurisdiction. Acting pursuant to discretionary power, the 
court ruled, based upon justice and equity, that the process 
served upon the defendant-appellant Skychoppers of Colorado 
was defective yet curable by amendment. There is no case 
law or any other authority which can contradict this 
position. 
It must be assumed by the record on file herein 
that the court considered all possible arguments that were, 
or should have been raised by the defendant-appellant, and 
that in the court's discretion, equity and justice were best 
served by not allowin8 an extreme forfeiture to take place. 
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Allowing the plaintiffs to amend their process and let 
the matter be tried on the merits rather than be destroyed 
by a technical deficiency is a proper result of this 
controversy. 
IB-IEREFORE, plaintiffs-respondents urge the court 
to affirm the decision of the court below. 
1980. 
Respectfully submitted this .22-aay of September, 
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